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Abstract
We provide a theory of pricing for emerging asset classes, like
emerging markets, that are not yet mature enough to be attractive to
the general public. Our model provides an explanation for the volatile
access of emerging economies to international financial markets and
for several stylized facts we identify in the data during the 1990’s. We
present a general equilibrium model with incomplete markets and endogenous collateral and an extension encompassing adverse selection.
We show that contagion, flight to liquidity and issuance rationing can
occur in equilibrium during what we call global anxious times.
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Introduction

Since the 1990’s emerging markets have become increasingly integrated into
global financial markets, becoming an asset class. However, contrary to what
was widely predicted by policy makers and economic theorists, these changes
have not translated into better consumption smoothing opportunities for
emerging economies. The access to international markets itself has turned
out to be very volatile and, even worse, emerging economies with sound
fundamentals are the ones who seem to suffer more during periods of low
debt issuance. We suggest that this disheartening picture is a symptom of
an unfinished integration into global financial markets.
The goal of this paper is to present a theory of asset pricing that will shed
light on the problems of “emerging” assets (like emerging markets) that are
not yet mature enough to be attractive to the general public. Their marginal
buyers are liquidity constrained investors with small wealth relative to the
whole economy, who are also marginal buyers of other risky assets. We will
use our theory to argue that the periodic problems faced by “emerging” asset
classes are sometimes symptoms of what we call a global anxious economy
rather than of their own fundamental weaknesses.
We distinguish three different conditions of financial markets: (i) the
normal economy, when leverage is high but the liquidity preference is low; (ii)
the anxious economy when leverage is curtailed and the liquidity preference is
high, and the general public is anxiously selling risky assets to more confident
natural buyers; and (iii) the crisis or panicked economy when many formerly
leveraged natural buyers are forced to liquidate or sell-off their positions to a
reluctant public, often going bankrupt in the process. A recent but growing
literature on leverage and financial markets has concentrated on crises or
panicked economies. We concentrate on the anxious economy (a much more
frequent phenomenon) and provide an explanation with testable implications
for (i) contagion, (ii) flight to liquidity and (iii) differential issuance rationing.
2

Our theory provides a rationale for the stylized facts present in emerging
markets, and perhaps also explains some price behavior of other “emerging”
asset classes like the US sub-prime mortgage market.
In Section 2 we look at issuance and spread behavior of emerging market
and high yield bonds during the six year period 1997-2002, which includes the
fixed income liquidity crisis of 1997-98. This crisis lasted for a few months,
or about 4% of the sample period. Our estimates show, however, that during
20% of this period, primary markets for emerging market bonds were closed.
Traditionally, periods of abnormally low access have been explained by showing that weak emerging market fundamentals were responsible (stressing the
demand of funds side). This paper will argue that closures are often a symptom of an anxious global economy. We will provide a theory for how shocks
in other globally traded sectors like high yield can be transmitted to emerging markets even during less dramatic times than crises like the one in 1998.
Recent empirical evidence also points to the supply side of funds (see Calvo
et al. (2004) and Fostel and Kaminsky (2007)).
We describe three stylized facts present in the data. First, emerging
market and high yield bonds show spread correlation (of 33% on average)
even though their payoffs would seem to be uncorrelated. In particular,
during emerging market closures there is an increase in spreads and volatility
for both assets. Second, although emerging market spreads increase during
closures, the behavior across the credit spectrum within the asset class is
not the same: high-rated emerging market spreads increase less than lowrated emerging market spreads. Third, during closures the drop in issuance
is not uniform either: high-rated emerging market issuance drops more than
low-rated emerging market issuance. Issuance from emerging countries with
sound fundamentals suffers more, even though high rated spreads change
much less.
The starting points for our analysis are Geanakoplos (2003) and Fostel
(2005). The first paper described what we now call the leverage cycle. Bad
news not only reduces the value of assets, but it also gives rise to expectations
of high volatility, which leads forward looking lenders to set higher margins,
which contracts buying and thus causes more price declines. In normal times
the endogenous equilibrium leverage is too high, in crises times equilibrium
leverage is too low. The second paper extended the leverage cycle to an
3

economy with multiple assets and introduced what we now call the anxious
economy.
In section 3 we introduce our notion of the anxious economy. This is
the state when bad news lowers expected payoffs somewhere in the global
economy (say in high yield), increases the expected volatility of ultimate high
yield payoffs, and creates more disagreement about high yield, but gives no
information about emerging market payoffs. A critical element of our story is
that bad news not only increases uncertainty, it also increases heterogeneity.
When the probability of default is low there cannot be much difference in
opinion. Bad news raises the probability of default and also the scope for
disagreement. Investors who were relatively more pessimistic before become
much more pessimistic afterward. One might think of the anxious economy
as a stage that is frequently attained after bad news, and that occasionally
devolves into a sell-off if the news grows much worse, but which often (indeed
usually) reverts to normal times. After a wave of bad news that lowers prices,
investors must decide whether to cut their losses and sell, or to invest more at
bargain prices. This choice is sometimes described on Wall Street as whether
or not to catch a falling knife.
For simplicity we suppose agents are divided into a small group of optimists, representing the natural buyers of the assets, and a large group of
pessimists, representing the general public. Both groups are completely rational, forward looking, expected utility maximizers, but with different priors.
Heterogeneity is important because it means that the valuation of an asset
depends critically on what a potentially small segment of the economy thinks
of it. Even if the asset is small relative to the size of the whole economy,
it might be significant relative to the wealth of the segment of the population most inclined to hold it. If markets were complete, then in equilibrium
everyone on the margin would be equally inclined to hold every asset. But
with incomplete markets it may well happen that assets are entirely held by
small segments of the population.
In this context, the first question that the model tries to solve is the
following: If the bad news only affects one sector, say high yield, will asset
prices in sectors with independent payoffs like emerging markets be affected?
This is not only a pressing problem for emerging markets. In 2007 the subprime mortgage market may suffer losses on the order of $250 billion, which
4

is tiny compared to the whole economy. Could this have a big effect on other
asset prices? In other words, is contagion possible in equilibrium?
We show in Section 3 that when the economy is reducible to a representative agent, the answer is no. We also show that if the economy has
heterogeneous investors but complete markets, and if optimists’ wealth is
small relative to the whole economy, then the answer is still no.
At the end of section 3, we show that in an economy with heterogeneous
investors and incomplete markets (that limit borrowing), it is possible to get
contagion without leverage. In the anxious economy emerging market bonds
will fall in value in tandem with the high yield bonds, even though there
is no new information about them. This fall derives from a portfolio effect
and a consumption effect. The consumption effect arises when consumption
goes down and marginal utility of consumption today goes up, lowering the
relative marginal utility of all assets promising future payoffs. The portfolio
effect refers to the differential dependence of portfolio holdings on news.
After the bad news, the pessimistic investors abandon high yield, and the
optimists take advantage of the lower prices to increase their investments
in high yield. When the optimists increase their investment in high yield,
they must withdraw money from somewhere else, like emerging markets and
consumption. This causes the price of emerging market bonds to fall. For
the fall to be big, it is important that optimists were substantial holders
of emerging market bonds, that the pessimists will not easily replace them
without a substantial price inducement, and that the pesssimists are willing
to purchase high yield bonds, at least after good news.
This theoretical mechanism is compatible with the recent evolution of
the emerging market investor base. Emerging market bonds are still not a
mature enough asset class to become attractive to the general public (the
pessimists), and at the same time the marginal buyers of these assets are
crossover investors willing to move to other asset classes like high yield. The
proportion of crossover investors was negligible before 1997 but by 2002 accounted for more than 40% of the investor base.
A popular story is that leverage (say in high yield) causes bigger losses
after bad news, which causes leveraged investors to sell other assets (like
emerging markets), which causes contagion. This story implicitly relies on
incomplete markets (otherwise leverage is irrelevant) and on heterogeneous
5

agents (since there must be borrowers and lenders to have leverage). The
popular story is a sell-off story during panicked economies. The most optimistic buyers are forced to sell off their high yield assets, and more assets
besides, holding less of high yield after the bad news than before. Asset
trades in the anxious stage thus move in exactly the opposite direction from
the crisis stage. In the anxious economy it is the public that is selling in the
bad news sector, and the most optimistic investors who are buying.
In the popular story there are usually massive defaults and bankruptcies
(since the high yield holdings were not enough to meet margin calls). But
these events are rare, happening once or twice a decade. Our data describes
events with ten to twenty times the frequency, happening roughly twice a
year. To explain our data on emerging market closures we tell a story that
places liquidity and leverage on center stage, but which does not have the
extreme behavior of the sell-off. We describe an anxious economy, not a
panicked economy.
To study the role of leverage in contagion we introduce our model of
general equilibrium with endogenous collateral in section 4. Agents are only
allowed to borrow money if they can put up enough collateral to guarantee delivery. Our model introduces the liquidity preference to quantify their
need for liquidity: it is the amount an agent would pay to be able to sell
an uncollateralized promise of one dollar at the riskless interest rate. Assets in our model play a dual role: they are investment opportunities, but
they can also be used as collateral. The collateral capacity of an asset is
the level of promises than can be made using the asset as collateral. Every
asset’s collateral capacity is determined in equilibrium by endogenous margins requirements. This in turn determines an asset’s borrowing capacity, or
liquidity, which is the amount of money that can be borrowed using the asset
as collateral (its collateral capacity discounted by the riskless interest rate).
We derive a pricing lemma which shows that the price of an asset can
always be decomposed as the sum of its payoff value and its collateral value
to any agent who holds it. Ownership of an asset not only gives the holder
the right to receive future payments (reflected in the payoff value) but also
enables the holder to use it as collateral to borrow more money. We define
the collateral value of an asset to any agent as the product of his liquidity
preference and the asset’s collateral capacity.
6

We find that margins endogenously rise between the normal state in which
the economy begins, and the anxious stage reached after bad news.Together
with the portfolio and consumption effects, this creates a higher liquidity preference. The increase in liquidity preference in the anxious economy tends to
raise the collateral value of assets, and thus might work against the contagion.
Indeed, we find that in contrast to the crisis economy, leverage makes asset
prices higher in the anxious economy than they would have been without
leverage. Nevertheless, prices fall more with leverage; not because leverage
leads to asset under-valuation in the anxious economy after bad news (as
in the crisis economy), but because leverage leads to asset over-valuation in
the normal economy before bad news comes. Thus our model rationalizes
the contagion of Stylized Fact 1, and the role of leverage, but through a
mechanism different from the usual sell-off story characteristic of panicked
economies.
The second question is: Why isn’t the fall in prices of emerging market
bonds uniform? In the anxious economy asset prices generally fall, but assets with higher collateral values fall less. We call this phenomenon flight to
liquidity. Flight to Liquidity arises in equilibrium when: (1) liquidity preference is high, (2) margins are high and (3) the dispersion of margins between
assets is high. During flight to liquidity investors with heightened liquidity
preference prefer to buy assets that enable them to borrow money more easily (lower margins). The other side of the coin is that investors choose to
sell first those assets on which they cannot borrow money (higher margins);
this raises the most cash since the sales revenue net of loan repayment is
higher. We might thus equally call this “flight from illiquidity.” Moreover,
the model provides the following testable implication. We show that even
when two assets have the same information volatility, margins during normal times will be different and can predict which assets are the ones that
will suffer more during future flight to liquidity episodes. Traditionally the
deterioration in price of low quality assets is explained in terms of “flight
to quality” which in our model corresponds to movements in payoff values.
We show the presence of a different and complementary channel originating
almost exclusively from liquidity considerations. Our second result rationalizes Stylized Fact 2 since low-rated emerging market bonds exhibit higher
margins than high-rated emerging market bonds.
Finally, the third question the paper aims to answer is why the fall in
7

issuance during closures in not uniform. To address this, section 5 extends
our first model to encompass the supply of emerging market assets as well
as asymmetric information between countries and investors. The departing
point here is Dubey and Geanakoplos (2002), which developed techniques to
incorporate adverse selection-signalling into a general equilibrium model. In
our paper we extend our general equilibrium model with incomplete markets
and collateral with the same goal. We show that flight to liquidity combined with asymmetric information between investors and countries leads to
differential issuance rationing. “Good” type country assets are better collateral than “bad” type country assets. During episodes of global anxiety
and high liquidity preference, the price differential between asset types increases. When investors cannot perfectly observe these types only a drastic
drop in good quality issuance removes the incentive of bad types to mimic
good types, maintaining the separating equilibrium. In a world with no informational noise, spillovers from other markets and flight to liquidity may
even help “good” issuance. However, with some degree of informational noise
between countries and investors, good quality assets suffer more. Our third
result rationalizes stylized Fact 3.
The first result in the paper is related to a big literature on contagion.
Despite the range of different approaches there are mainly three different
kinds of models. The first kind blends financial theories with macroeconomic techniques, and seeks for international transmission channels associated with macroeconomic variables. Examples of this approach are Goldfajn and Valdes (1997), Agenor and Aizenman (1998), Corsetti, Pesenti and
Roubini (1999) and Pavlova and Rigobon (2006). The second kind models
contagion as information transmission. In this case the fundamentals of assets are assumed to be correlated. When one asset declines in price because
of noise trading, rational traders reduce the prices of all assets since they are
unable to distinguish declines due to fundamentals from declines due to noise
trading. Examples of this approach are King and Wadhwani (1990), Calvo
(1999), Calvo and Mendoza (2000), Cipriani and Guarino (2001) and Kodres
and Pritsker (2002). Finally, there are theories that model contagion through
wealth effects as in Kyle and Xiong (2001). When some key financial actors
suffer losses they liquidate positions in several markets, and hence this sell-off
generates price co-movement. The last two approaches have in common a
focus exclusively on contagion as a financial market phenomenon, abstracting from macroeconomic variables, as does our paper. Our explanation is
8

complementary with all those studies.
Our second result is related to a big literature on liquidity. Under supply
of liquidity and liquidity crises were studied in several papers like Geanakoplos (1997), Holmstrom and Tirole (1998), Caballero and Krishnamurthy
(2001), Morris and Shin (2004) and Fostel and Geanakoplos (2004). Flight
to Liquity was modeled by Vayanos (2004) who gets it in a model where an
asset’s liquidity is defined by its exogenously given transaction cost. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2007) model flight to liquidity in the tradition of
modeling liquidity in Grossman and Miller (1988). In their paper, market
liquidity is the gap between fundamental value and the transaction price and
they show how this market liquidity interacts with funding liquidity (given
by trader’s capital and margin requirements). In our paper we model an
asset’s liquidity as its capacity as collateral to raise cash. Hence, our liquidity preference arises from endogenously determined time varying margin
requirements in equilibrium.
The third result is related to the tradition of credit rationing as in Stiglitz
and Weiss (1981). Also, to an increasing literature that tries to model asymmetric information within general equilibrium like Gale (1992), Bisin and
Gottardi (2006) and Rustichini and Siconolfi (2007). We treat it in a framework of perfect competition following the techniques of Dubey-Geanakoplos
(2002) through pooling of promises. The result is also related to several papers in the sovereign debt literature that have worked under the assumption
of asymmetric information between investors and countries, as in Alfaro and
Kanuczuk (2005) and Catão, Fostel and Kapur (2007).
Finally, our model is related to a vast literature that explains financial
crises, sudden stops, and lack of market access in emerging market economies.
The sovereign debt literature as in Bulow-Rogoff (1989), stresses moral hazard and reputation issues. The three “generations” of models of currency
crises explain reversals in capital flows by pointing to fiscal and monetary
causes as in Krugman (1979), to unemployment and overall loss of competitiveness as in Obstfeld (1994) and to banking fragility and overall excesses
in financial markets as in Kaminsky and Reinhart (1999) and Chang and
Velasco (2001). Others explore the role of credit frictions to explain sudden
stops as in Calvo (1998) and Mendoza (2004). Others focus on balance sheet
effects as in Krugman (1999), Aghion et al.(2004), Schneider and Tornell
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(2004), and finally on the interaction of financial and goods markets as in
Martin and Rey (2006) to mention a few.

2

Stylized Facts

Following Fostel (2005) we look at Emerging Market issuance of dollardenominated sovereign bonds covering the period 1997-2002. The data we
use is obtained by Dealogic, which compiles daily information on issuance
at the security level. We define a Primary Market Closure 1 as a period
of 3 consecutive weeks or more during which the weekly primary issuance
over all Emerging Markets is less than 40 percent of the period’s trend. As
shown in table 1, market closures are not rare events. During this period,
there were 13 market closures which implies that 20.29% of the time primary
markets of emerging market bonds were closed. Finally, while some of the
closures seemed associated with events in emerging countries, others seemed
to correspond with events in mature economies.
During the same period, we look at the secondary markets of Emerging
Markets and US High Yield bonds. We use daily data on spreads from the
JPMorgan index EMBI+ for Emerging Markets and the Merrill Lynch index
for US High Yield. Data for Emerging Market spreads disaggregated by
credit ratings is available at weekly frequency from Merrill Lynch indexes.2
We will describe now three stylized facts present in the data during this
period.
Fact 1: Emerging Market and US High Yield Spread Correlation
Emerging Markets and US High Yield exhibit a positive spread correlation, and in particular around closures both exhibit increasing spread and
volatility behavior.
The average correlation during the period is .33. Figure 1 shows average
spread behavior for both assets from 20 days before to 20 days after the
1

We follow IMF (2003).
Although spreads at issuance, which reflect the actual cost of capital, may be the most
relevant for the issuer, portfolio managers arguably follow spreads in secondary markets
more closely. Also, these spreads available at higher frequency may reflect subtle changes
in global investing conditions more accurately than lower frequency data.
2
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Average Spreads around Closures
Emerging Market

US High Yield Spreads
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points
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Closure
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Figure 1: Average Spread behavior.
beginning of a typical closure. The increasing spreads around closures is also
true for 20-day rolling volatility as shown in figure 2. This increasing pattern
is robust across all closures in the sample and to different rolling windows
specifications.
Fact 2: Credit Rating and Emerging Market Spreads
Although Emerging Market spreads increase around market closures, the
behavior across the credit spectrum within the asset class is not uniform:
high-rated Emerging Market spreads increase less than low-rated Emerging
Market spreads. By low-rated we mean all sub-investment grade bonds, i.e.
everything below or equal BB.
Figure 3 shows the average weekly percent change in spreads around closures for different Emerging Markets ratings. On average low-rated spreads
increase more than high-rated spreads, and this behavior is robust across
closures as well.
Fact 3: Credit Rating and Emerging Markets Primary Issuance
11

Average Spread Volatility around Closures

Emerging Market

US High Yield

s.d.

s.d.

Closure

days

Closure

days

Figure 2: Average spread volatility.
During primary market closures the drop in issuance is not uniform across
the credit spectrum: high-rated Emerging Markets issuance drops more than
low-rated Emerging Markets issuance. While high-rated issuance accounts
for 23% during normal times, it only accounts for 12% during closures. Hence
during crises, emerging market economies with sound fundamentals seem to
suffer more (issue less). One may argue that we should expect this behavior
since precisely those good fundamentals allow countries to look for alternative
sources of financing during bad times. However, this drastic reduction in
issuance is puzzling when considered jointly with the behavior in spreads
described before: high-rated issuance decreases more than low-rated issuance
despite the fact that high-rated spreads increase less than low-rated spreads.
Finally, given the ad-hoc nature of the definition of market closures, we
conduct a robustness check for different thresholds and trend specifications.
Of course, the number of closures varies, but it never becomes less than 10
or more than 14. And more importantly, all three stylized facts are still
remarkably robust to all these different specifications.3
3

Results are available from the authors upon request.
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BBB- and higher
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weeks

Figure 3: Average weekly percentage change in spreads by credit rating.

3
3.1

The Problem
The Anxious Economy

We introduce the theoretical problem motivated by the empirical section
through a simple example described in figure 4. Consider a world with four
instruments: a single consumption good, a high yield asset H, and two emerging market assets E of differing quality, E G and E B (good and bad type of
emerging markets). Asset payoffs are denominated in units of the single consumption good. These payoffs come in the terminal nodes, and are uncertain.
Agents have riskless initial endowments e of the consumption good at
each node. While agents are endowed with H, they need to buy E G and E B
from emerging countries, which at each state enter the market and decide
their issuance.
We shall suppose that news about H arrives between periods 1 and 2, and
news about H and E arrives between periods 2 and 3. Good news corresponds
13

to up, U , and bad news to down, D. Arriving at D makes everyone believe
that H is less likely to be productive, but gives no information about E G
and E B . After U , (which occurs with probability q) the ouput of H is 1
for sure, but after D the output of H can be either 1, with probability q,
or H < 1, with probability 1 − q. The output of E G (E B ) is either 1, with
probability q, or G (B), with probability 1 − q, irrespective of whether U or
D is reached and independent from the output of H. H, G and B can be
interpreted as recovery values in the case of asset default and are such that
H < 1, B < G < 1.

UU

(1,1,1)
q
U
1-q

UD

q

(G,B,1)

1
DUU

1-q

(1,1,1)
q2
D

DDU

(1-q)q
(1-q)q

(G,B,1)
DUD

(1-q)2

B < G < 1, H < 1

(1,1,H)
DDD

(G,B,H)

Figure 4: The anxious economy at state D.
At U the uncertainty about H is resolved, but at D it becomes greater
than ever. This stands in sharp contrast with traditional financial models,
where asset values are modeled by Brownian motions with constant volatilities.
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We call state D the anxious economy. This is the state occurring just
after bad news lowers expected payoffs in high yield (our proxy for the global
economy), increases the expected volatility of ultimate high yield payoffs,
and creates more disagreement about high yield, but gives no information
about emerging market payoffs. State D will not turn out be a crisis situation
because agents get a new infusion of endowments e.
In discussing asset price changes we must keep in mind how much news
is arriving about payoff values. We would expect asset prices to be more
volatile if there is a lot of news about their own payoff, and to be less volatile
or even flat if there is no news. In our setup there is an acceleration of news
over time, and eventually more news about E B than about E G . There are
situations when this kind of uncertainty is natural, for example, if everyone
can see that a day is approaching when some basic uncertainty is going to
be resolved.4
To be precise, for each asset A and each node s, let us define Es (A) as the
expected terminal delivery of A conditional on having reached s. Similarly,
define the informational volatility at s, Vs (A), as the standard deviation of
Eα (A) over all immediate successors α of s. Then E1 (E G ) = q1 + (1 − q)G =
EU (E G ) = ED (E G ). Thus V1 (E G ) = 0. There is no information about the
payoffs of E G between periods 1 and 2. Similarly E1 (E B ) = q1 + (1 − q)B =
EU (E B ) = ED (E B ). Thus V1 (E B ) = 0. However, 0 < VU (E G ) = VD (E G ) <
VU (E B ) = VD (E B ) , provided B < G < 1.
Naturally the price of H falls from 1 to D and is lower at D than at U
since the bad news lowers its expected payoff. However, the expected payoff
of E G (and E B ) is exactly the same at U and at D, as is its information
volatility.
1. Why should the prices of E G and E B fall from 1 to D and be lower
at D than at U (even without a shock to them)? We will refer to this
problem as Contagion.
2. Why should the price of E B fall more than the price of E G from 1 to D?
And why the gap in prices between U and D should be bigger for E B
4

At the present time everyone can see that a year from now subprime mortgages from
the bad 2006 vintage will reset and then it will be revealed how bad the defaults will be.
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than for E G ? We will refer to this problem as Differential Contagion.
Moreover, is there a market signal at time 1 that can predict which
asset will perform worse at D?
3. Why should emerging market issuance fall from 1 to D, but more importantly, why should the issuance of E G fall more than the issuance
of E B ? And why the gap in issuance between U and D should be bigger for E G than for E B ? We will refer to this problem as Differential
Issuance Rationing.5
Answers to problems 1, 2 and 3 will help rationalize stylized facts 1,
2 and 3 respectively. The first model in section 4 will focus on contagion
and differential contagion while the second model in section 5 will focus on
issuance rationing. Hence, until section 5 we will assume a fixed supply of
emerging market assets. Before introducing the first model, let us go back to
our example and attempt to gain intuition about what is involved in solving
the first two problems within standard models.

3.2

Representative Agent

For a moment, let us abstract from different types of emerging market assets and consider only two assets, E (Emerging Market) and H (High Yield),
with independent payoffs as discussed before.6 Intuitively, since E and H are
independent assets, one would expect uncorrelated price behavior in equilibrium. And in fact, this intuition is correct in certain cases as we will discuss
now.
Consider an economy with a representative investor with logarithmic utility who does not discount the future. Simulation 1 calculates equilibrium
prices using the following parameter values7 : the recovery values are E = .1
and H = .2, initial endowments are e = 2020 in every node, beliefs are given
5

Though what we see in the data corresponds to movements from 1 to D, from a
theoretical point of view it makes sense to compare with the counterfactual state U as
well.
6
Equivalently, assume that G = B, so there is no difference between the emerging
market assets.
7
Sections 3.4 and 4.2.1 will extensively discuss the choice of parameter values.
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by q = .9 and finally the agent is endowed with 2 units of each asset at the
beginning. The first part of table 2 shows that the price of H falls at D
since its expected output is lower. But the equilibrium price of E is slightly
higher at D than at U , so E and H are actually slightly negatively correlated. There is no contagion. The reason for this is very simple: at D future
consumption is lower than at U since H is less productive, so the marginal
utility for future output like from E is slightly higher.

3.3

Heterogeneous Agents and Complete Markets

Let us extend the previous model to allow for heterogeneous agents. Agents
will differ in beliefs and wealth. There are “optimists” who assign probability
q O = .9 and “pessimists” who assign probability q P = .5 to good news about
H and E. Because of their beliefs, optimists have a higher opinion at 1 about
H than pessimists do. While optimists think H will pay fully with probability
1 − (1 − q O )2 = .99, pessimists only attach probability 1 − (1 − q P )2 = .75
to the same event. At D their opinions about H fully paying diverge even
more, q O = .9 > q P = .5. This growing dispersion of beliefs after bad news
is not universal, but is plausible in some cases and will be important to our
results.
Initial endowments are eO = 20 and eP = 2000 for optimists and pessimists respectively in all states. Each type of investor owns 1 unit of each
asset at the beginning. The rest of the parameters are as in simulation 1.
Suppose for now that markets are complete in the sense that all Arrow
securities are present. The second part of table 2 shows that prices exhibit
only a tiny degree of contagion. The reason for any contagion is that with
complete markets, agents are able to transfer wealth to the states which
they think are relatively more likely. Therefore, at D prices reflect more the
pessimist preferences (and hence may be slightly lower than at U ). However,
as we make pessimists richer and richer, this type will become close to a
representative agent and all prices will reflect his preferences. In the limit
contagion will disappear as shown by simulation 1. We will see that with
incomplete markets, making pessimists richer will not kill contagion; in fact
it makess contagion worse.
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3.4
3.4.1

Incomplete Markets and Heterogeneous Agents
Contagion, Portfolio Effect and Consumption Effect

Simulations 1 and 2 show that contagion without correlated fundamentals
is not a general phenomenon. The first example illustrates the need for
some kind of agent heterogeneity while the second highlights the need for
market incompleteness. In the next example we will assume both. Agents
are heterogeneous. As before, they differ in beliefs and endowments which
are given by q 0 = .9, q P = .5, eO = 20 and eP = 2000 respectively. Each
type of investor starts with 1 unit of each asset E and H at the beginning
and trades these assets thereafter.
But now markets are assumed to be incomplete. Agents can only trade
the physical assets E and H, and the consumption good. Arrow securities
are assumed not present and agents are not allowed to borrow. Given that
D is followed by four states, two assets are not enough to complete markets.
But even at 1 markets are incomplete due to the presence of short sales
constraints.8
Let us take a moment to discuss parameter values before presenting simulation 3. As before, we assume that H’s recovery value is bigger than E’s,
in particular H = .2, E = .1. This constitutes a realistic assumption since in
general the recovery value from a domestic firm is bigger than the one from
foreign countries due to the absence of international bankruptcy courts. As
above, investors have logarithmic utilities and do not discount the future.
We think of optimists as the class of investors who find emerging markets
an attractive asset class, whereas pessimists are thought of as the “normal”
public who invest in the US stock market. While the market for emerging
markets bonds accounted for approximately 200 billion dollars, the US stock
market accounted for approximately 20 trillion dollars by the end of 2002.
Hence we have given pessimists 100 times the wealth of optimists.
Results for simulation 3 are shown in tables 3, 4 and 5. Prices for E and
H rise at U and fall at D, displaying contagion. Along the path from 1 to D
8

Markets are incomplete means there is a node at which agents, at equilibrium prices,
cannot create all the Arrow securities that span the dimension of the set of successors
states.
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of bad news about H, the price of H naturally falls, declining 19% from .9 to
.74. The price of E falls as well from 1 to D, even when there was no specific
bad shock to it. It goes from .8 to .73, a decline of 8.6%. The difference in
prices between U and D for H is 26.25% and for E is 15.7%.
Why does E fall in price in the anxious economy? First, because of a
portfolio effect. Second, because of a consumption effect.
What is crucial in the portfolio effect is that optimists hold more of H
after bad news than after good news about H. At U news are so good that
both types agree about H and optimists end up holding none of it. However,
at D, when asset volatility has gone up, the difference in opinion increases, so
optimists see a special opportunity and end up holding all H. Given constant
wealth, they have relatively less wealth to spend on E and on consumption.
The reduction in the demand for E naturally lowers its price. Equivalently,
the portfolio effect generates a consumption effect: consumption goes down
(by 9%) and marginal utility goes up from U to D, reducing the marginal
utility of E relative to consumption. Thus, the price of E mimics the price of
H. Since the price at 1 is an average of the prices at U and D, the portfolio
effect also implies that the price falls from 1 to D.
The portfolio and consumption effects also explain why the fall of 26.25%
in the price of H from U to D is bigger than the fall in its expected payoff
of 8%.
Investor heterogeneity and market incompleteness are what generate the
portfolio and consumption effects; without them contagion may well disappear. Heterogeneous beliefs (at time 1) make emerging market assets less
attractive to the “normal public”, modeled here as pessimists, but extremely
attractive to another class of investors, modeled here as optimists. Contagion becomes possible when these optimistic investors become “crossover”
investors, ready to move part of their capital to high yield bonds when they
see a special opportunity. This portfolio effect is in line with important
changes that have taken place in the investor base for emerging market assets in recent years. In particular, the proportion of crossover investors was
negligible before 1997 but by 2002 accounted for more than 40%.9 The correlation between emerging markets and US high yield spreads was negligible
9

See IMF (2003).
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before 1997 and was on average 33% in the period 1997 to 2002 covered in
this paper.
On the other hand, while leveraged investors such as hedge-funds accounted for 30% of all activity in emerging markets in 1998, this share declined to 10% by 2002. The impact of hedge funds, through their leveraged
positions, on contagion has received substantial attention in both academic
and official communities and there is an agreement that this decline has
contributed to an easing of contagion and volatility more recently.
Simulation 3 shows that portfolio and consumption effects are enough to
generate contagion without leverage (although the fall in E from 1 to D was
only half of the fall from U to D). Since it is usual to associate contagion
with leverage, we will introduce collateral, and hence leverage, in section 4.
It will turn out that leverage will reduce contagion as measured by a fall from
U to D, but it will generate a bigger price crash from 1 to D .
3.4.2

Differential Contagion

Consider our example with 3 assets, H, E G and E B , B < G. Are the
portfolio and consumption effects enough to generate not only contagion but
differential contagion across emerging market assets of differing quality in
the anxious economy?
Simulation 4 calculates the equilibrium for the same parameter values
as before except the recovery values which now are H = .2, G = .2 and
B = .05 (the emerging market asset E with recovery value .1 is replaced
by a good emerging market asset with higher recovery value, .2, and a bad
emerging market asset with a lower recovery value, .05). Tables 6, 7 and 8
present the results. As in simulation 3, the portfolio and consumption effects
generate contagion. However, assets of different quality get hit in the same
way creating an homogeneous fall in prices. Therefore, simulation 4 shows the
need of something more than agent heterogeneity and market incompleteness
to solve the second problem of differential contagion. The model developed
in section 4 will provide a framework to attack both problems of contagion
and differential contagion.
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4

Model I: Collateral General Equilibrium

So far we have not allowed agents to borrow; they were very limited in how
much they could spend on buying what they thought were underpriced assets.
Letting the agents use assets as collateral to borrow money enables them to
take more extreme positions, which will have important consequences for
asset pricing.
Standard General Equilibrium theory with incomplete markets does not
include collateral. We present a model of collateral equilibrium adapted from
Geanakoplos (1997), Geanakoplos and Zame (1998) and Geanakoplos (2003).
Though our model is not as general, it enables us to address our three questions by including two critical features from the more general theory. First,
agents are never required to deliver more than the value of their collateral
and second, collateral levels needed to back a given promise are endogenously
determined in equilibrium.

4.1
4.1.1

The Model
Time and Uncertainty

The model is a finite-horizon general equilibrium model, with t = 1, · · · , T .
Uncertainty is represented by a tree of date-events or states s ∈ S, including
a root s = 1. Each state s 6= 1 has an immediate predecessor s∗ , and each
non-terminal node s ∈ S\ST has a set S(s) of immediate successors. Each
successor τ ∈ S(s) is reached from s via a branch σ ∈ B(s); we write τ = sσ.
We denote the time of s by the number of nodes t(s) on the path from 1
to s. For instance, in our example in figure 4 we have that the immediate
predecessor of U U is U U ∗ = U . The set of immediate successors of U is
S(U ) = {U U, U D}. Each of these successors is reached from U via a branch
in the set B(U ) = {U, D}. Finally, the time of U is t(U ) = 2.
4.1.2

Assets and Collateral

A financial contract k consists of both a promise and collateral backing it,
so it is described by a pair (Ak , Ck ). Collateral consists of durable goods,
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which will be called assets. The lender has the right to seize as much of the
collateral as will make him whole once the loan comes due, but no more.
This paper will focus on a special type of contract. In each state s its
e where 1
e ∈ RS(s) stands for the vector of ones
promise is given by φs · 1,
with dimension equal the number of successors of s. The contract (φs ·
e C) promises φ units of consumption good in each successor state and is
1,
s
backed by collateral C. If the collateral is big enough to avoid default, the
price of this special contract is given by φs /(1 + rs ), where rs is the riskless
interest rate. Now, let us be more precise about how the collateral levels are
determined.
There is a single consumption good x ∈ R+ .10 Each asset j ∈ J delivers
a dividend of the good Dsj in each state s ∈ S. The set of assets J is divided
into those assets j ∈ J c that can be used as collateral and those assets
j ∈ J\J c that cannot. We shall assume that households are only allowed to
issue at each state a non-contingent promise backed by collateral so large that
payment is guaranteed, ruling out the possibility of default in equilibrium.11
Thus, holding one unit of collateralizable asset j ∈ J c in state s permits an
agent to issue φs promises to deliver one unit of the consumption good in
each immediate successor state t ∈ S(s), such that
φs ≤ min [pjt + Dtj ]
t∈S(s)

(1)

The collateral capacity of one unit of asset j at state s is defined by
its minimum yield (its price plus the deliveries) in the immediate future
states. Notice that the collateral capacity φs of an asset j at s is endogenous,
depending on the equilibrium prices pjt , t ∈ S(s).12 The borrowing capacity
of asset j at s is defined by φs /(1 + rs ). It depends on the interest rate rs ,
as well as the endogenous collateral capacity of asset j.
Now we are in position to define one of the key concepts in the paper. Buying 1 unit of j on margin at state s means: selling a promise of mint∈S(s) [pjt +
10

Considering a single consumption good greatly simplifies notation without loss of
generality since the focus here will be primarily on asset prices.
11
This will make the argument stronger: even in the absence of default, there will be
inefficiencies in international financial markets.
12
Geanakoplos (2003) showed that with heterogeneous priors and two successors states,
even if agents were allowed to use j to collateralize any promise of the form λe
1, they would
never choose λ > mint∈S(s) [pjt + Dtj ].
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1
·mint∈S(s) [pjt +Dtj ])
Dtj ] using that unit of j as collateral, and paying (pjs − 1+r
s
in cash. The margin of j at s is,

mjs =

pjs −

1
1+rs

· mint∈S(s) [pjt + Dtj ]
pjs

(2)

The margin is given by the current asset price net of the amount borrowed using the asset as collateral, as a proportion of the price, i.e., the cash
requirement needed to buy the asset today as a proportion of its price. We
will denote as leverage the inverse of the margin. Similarly, the borrowing
capacity of asset j per dollar invested is defined to be 1 − mjs . The margin
requirement is not only endogenous but also a forward looking variable; it
depends on the current price and on how the asset is going to be priced in
the future, and on the interest rate. These facts will be of great importance,
in particular, they will have a big effect on asset pricing as discussed below.
4.1.3

Investors

Each agent i ∈ I is characterized by a utility, ui , a discounting factor, δ i and
subjective probabilities, q i . We assume that the Bernoulli utility function for
consumption in each state s ∈ S, ui : R+ → R is continuous, concave and
monotonic. Agent i assigns subjective probability qsi to the transition from
s∗ to s. (Naturally q1 = 1). Letting q̄si be the product of all qsi 0 along the
path from 1 to s, the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility to agent i
is
X
t(s)−1 i
q̄si δi
u (xs )
(3)
Ui =
s∈S

Each investor i begins with an endowment of the consumption good
eis ∈ R+ in each state s ∈ S, and an endowment of assets at the beginning
J
y1i ∗ ∈ R+
. We assume that all assets and the consumption good are present,
P
P
i
y
>>
0 and i∈I eis > 0, ∀s ∈ S. Given prices ((ps , rs ), s ∈ S)13 , each
i∈I 1∗
agent i ∈ I decides consumption, xs , asset holdings, ysj , and borrowing (lending), φs , in order to maximize utility (3) subject to the budget set defined
as
13

The consumption good is the numeraire, so pxs = 1.
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S
SJ
B i (p, r) = {(x, y, φ) ∈ R+
× R+
× RS : ∀s
X
X
1
(xs − eis ) +
pjs (ysj − ys∗ j ) ≤
φs − φs∗ +
ys∗ j Dsj
1 + rs
j∈J
j∈J

X

φs ≤

j∈J c

ysj min [pjt + Dtj ]}
t∈S(s)

In each state s, expenditures on consumption minus endowments of the
good, plus total expenditures on assets minus asset holdings carried over from
the last period, can be at most equal to the money borrowed selling promises,
minus the payments due at s from promises made in the previous period,
plus the total asset deliveries. Notice that there is no sign constraint on φs ;
a positive (negative) φs indicates the agent is selling (buying) promises or in
other words, borrowing (lending) money. The last line displays the collateral
constraint: the total amount of promises made at s cannot exceed the total
collateral capacity of all collateralizable asset holdings.
4.1.4

Collateral Equilibrium

A Collateral Equilibrium in this economy is a set of prices and holdings such
that
SJ
S
S
SJ
((p, r), (xi , y i , φi )i∈I ) ∈ R+
× R+
× (R+
× R+
× RS )I : ∀s

X

(xis − eis ) =

ysi ∗ j Dsj

i∈I j∈J

i∈I

X

XX

i
(ysj

−

ysi ∗ j )

= 0 : ∀j

i∈I

X
i

φis = 0

i∈I
i
i

(x , y , φ ) ∈ B i (p, r)
(x, y, φ) ∈ B i (p, r) ⇒ U i (x) ≤ U i (xi ) : ∀i
Markets for the consumption good, assets and promises clear in equilibrium, and agents optimize their utility constrained to their budget set as
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defined above. A Collateral Equilibrium always exists under all the described
assumptions in this model as shown by Geanakoplos and Zame (1998). As
is well known, this is not true for the standard General Equilibrium model
with incomplete markets since equilibrium may fail to exist without a bound
on promises; the best result in the standard model is only generic existence.
Collateral requirements fix this problem since they place (an endogenous)
bound on promises.
4.1.5

Asset Pricing

As mentioned above, endogenous margin requirements have a huge effect on
asset prices. An asset’s price reflects its future returns, but also its ability
to be used as collateral to borrow money. Consider a collateral equilibrium
i
in which an agent i holds an asset j at state s ∈ S, ysj
> 0 and suppose he
consumes a positive amount in each state. Suppose that asset j cannot be
used as collateral, then
i
j
j
i i
σ∈B(s) δi qsσ [psσ + Dsσ ]du (xsσ )/dx
dui (xis )/dx

P

pjs

=

P Vsj

=

(4)

The price equals the Payoff Value, P Vsj , i.e. the normalized expected
marginal utility of its future payoff. This equation remains true if j can be
used as collateral but the collateral constraint for i is not binding at s. In
that case the first order condition for borrowing also holds,
1
=
1 + rs

i i
i
σ∈B(s) δi qsσ du (xsσ )/dx
dui (xis )/dx

P

(5)

However, when an asset can be used as collateral, and the collateral constraint is binding, the situation for holding j and loans is quite different.
Agent i cannot take out an additional loan unless he holds additional collateral. Thus, even if the marginal disutility of repaying the loan is less than the
marginal utility of the money borrowed, it may just be impossible to borrow
more money:
1
>
1 + rs

i
i i
σ∈B(s) δi qsσ du (xsσ )/dx
dui (xis )/dx

P
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(6)

Similarly, buying j makes it possible to take out a loan, hence i may buy
j on margin even when the expected marginal utility of j is less than its
price. Then, we might well have that
i
j
j
i i
σ∈B(s) δi qsσ [psσ + Dsσ ]du (xsσ )/dx
dui (xis )/dx

P

pjs

>

P Vsj

=

(7)

Denote the difference between the left and right hand side in equation
(6) by the Liquidity Preference of i at s, LPsi , which gives a measure of how
much agent i values liquidity at s. Denote the debt of agent i backed by a
marginal unit of asset j as
if j 6∈ J c or if the collateral constraint
is not binding at s for i
φisj =


mint∈S(s) [pjt + Dtj ]
otherwise


 0

We define the Collateral Value of j at s as
CVsj = LPsi · φisj

(8)

The collateral value reflects the asset’s efficiency as liquidity provider.
This efficiency depends on two things. First, the asset’s collateral capacity
measured as the amount of promises that can be backed by a marginal unit
of the asset, φisj . Second, on how valuable is this collateral capacity to agent
i measured by the liquidity preference, LPsi . In fact, the following holds.
Pricing Lemma
i
Suppose that ysj
> 0. Then,

pjs = P Vsj + CVsj
The price equals the sum of the Payoff value and Collateral Value.14
14

These concepts relate to the standard concept of fundamental value of an asset in the
following way. Define the Fundamental Value of an asset j at s as
P
t(γ)−t(s) i
j
δi
q̄γ Dγ
dui (xiγ )/dx
F Vsj = γ∈Γ(s) dui (xi )/dx
s

where Γ(s) is the set of all the successors (not only immediate) and q̄γi is the product of all
qsi 0 along the path from s to γ. If the asset cannot be used as collateral, then pjs = P Vsj =
F Vsj . However, if the asset can be used as collateral, then typically pjs > P Vsj > F Vsj .
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Proof: The first order condition that obtains if i holds asset j is that
the marginal utility of the cash payment necessary to buy j is equal to the
expected marginal utility of the unencumbered payoff, i.e. the return on j
less the repayment of the debt. Then in equilibrium the following holds

pjs

1
φi =
−
1 + rs sj

+ Dsσj − φisj ]dui (xisσ )/dx
dui (xis )/dx

i
σ∈B(s) δi qsσ [psσj

P

(9)

The pricing lemma follows from the definitions of P Vsj and CVsj and
equation (9).
Another convenient way to state the pricing lemma is as follows. Let µis ∈
R
be the vector of marginal utilities weighted by state probabilities µisσ =
i
δi qsσ dui (xisσ )/dx
, σ ∈ B(s). Let 1e ∈ RS(s) the vector of ones with dimension
dui (xis )/dx
equal the number of successors of s. Let Ajs ∈ RS(s) be the vector of payoffs
j
]. Then, the payoff value
of asset j in each state following s, Ajsσ = [pjsσ + Dsσ
of j at s is given by
S(s)

P Vsj = µis · Ajs

(10)

and the liquidity preference of i at s is given by
LPsi =

1
− µis · 1e
1 + rs

(11)

From equations (8), (10) and (11) the pricing lemma can be stated as
pjs = µis · Ajs + (

4.2

1
e · φi
− µis · 1)
sj
1 + rs

(12)

Contagion and Collateral Values

In this section we will extend our example in order to understand the role
of collateral in contagion. Simulation 5 solves the equilibrium for the same
assets and investor characteristics as in simulation 3, except that now E can
be used as collateral to borrow money, and hence can be leveraged. For
simplicity, we will assume that this is not the case for H. Table 9 presents
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the equilibrium prices. As before, there is contagion due to the portfolio
effect. Is there something different this time?
The conventional wisdom is that leverage causes agents to lose more
money during crises, making asset prices even lower. On the contrary, we
find that during the anxious economy the asset prices are higher than they
would have been without collateral. Yet leverage still causes bigger price
crashes.
The Pricing Lemma will explain this. Table 10 provides disaggregated information about price components, liquidity preference and margin requirements in equilibrium at each node. In non-collateral simulation 3, E cannot
be used as collateral and the price equals its payoff value, whereas in collateral simulation 5 the price also includes collateral values.
At U the price in both simulations is almost the same. First, the payoff
values are high and essentially the same because optimists’ marginal utilities
µ are high and nearly the same. Second, the collateral value in simulation 3
is zero by definition. In simulation 5 it is small because, after good news at
U , the liquidity preference is small, and the collateral capacity is low in the
second period (the maximum promise equals .1 = min{1, .1}).
At D the payoff values are low since the portfolio and consumption effects
have caused µ to go down, as we saw before. The “wealth effect” implicit
in other models has almost no bite in the anxious stage at D: it is true
that leverage at 1 has a negative consumption effect at D, since it causes
optimists to lose more money. But this is almost exactly offset by a positive
consumption effect due to the possibility of borrowing again. The fall in
consumption from U to D of 9% we already saw in simulation 3 is barely
worsened to 10% by leverage in simulation 5. Hence, the payoff value at D is
only slightly lower with collateral than without. However, the collateral value
becomes significant. This is because the interest rates are nearly the same
and so the same decrease in µ that made the payoff value go down causes the
liquidity preference to go up, from .03 at U to .2 at D (see equation (11)).
This effect explains why the price at D is bigger when there is collateral, and
hence explains why the gap between U and D is smaller with collateral.15
15

One may wonder if leverage could destroy contagion at D since the collateral value
might rise enough to offset the fall in the payoff values. From equation (12) we can see
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At 1 the price is higher with collateral than without for three reasons.
First, the payoff value is higher than it was without collateral due to a consumption effect: borrowing at 1 allows bigger consumption, increasing µ.
Second, the payoff value is also higher due to the presence of future collateral values, which raises future prices. Third, the collateral value is high,
even though the liquidity preference is only moderate, because the collateral
capacity is high (since the asset values at U and D are still high).
Collateral has a bigger effect on prices at 1 than at D because it operates
through three channels instead of only one. The presence of these channels
explains why contagion, measured as the fall from 1 to D, is bigger when
there is collateral.
To sum up there are three important points. First, leverage is not necessary for contagion to occur in equilibrium as shown by simulation 3. Second,
collateral, through leverage, generates a bigger price crash. Third, the drop
in asset prices is not due to asset under-valuation during anxious times but
due to asset over-valuation during normal times.16
Finally, both simulations provide a solution to the first problem and in
particular rationalize Stylized Fact 1. Even without problems in Emerging
Market fundamentals, a bad shock to the High Yield sector could have negative spillovers on Emerging Markets.
that a lower µ reduces the payoff value, but increases the liquidity preference and hence
the collateral value. However, the change in collateral value cannot ever offset the changes
in payoff value. Rearranging equation (12) we get that
pjs = µis · (Ajs − φisj · e
1) +

1
1 + rs

(13)

If the interest rate does not change, a lower µ unambiguously lowers the price of the
asset since Ajs − φisj · e
1 > 0 from equation (1).
16
In the conventional story H is leveraged and the bad news about H induces investors
who are leveraged to sell E, causing the its price to fall more than if there had been no
leverage. However, when simulation 5 was extended to allow H, not only E, to be used
as collateral, all three conclusions remained intact. In particular, the price of E is higher
at D when both assets can be used collateral than when not.
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4.2.1

Robustness

The fundamental source of contagion is the portfolio effect, namely bad news
about H gives optimists an opportunity to hold it at attractive levels, reducing the money they can put into E. In simulation 5 optimists hold no H
after good news at U , and all of H after bad news at D. Table 11 provides
portfolio holdings and consumption at each node.
This corner solution gives an extreme form of the portfolio effect. One
may wonder how robust contagion is to other regimes, where for example
pessimists and optimists may both be marginal buyers of all the assets. Different parameter values will change asset holdings in equilibrium, allowing us
to explore this question. It turns out that the simulation is not just a fluke.
In fact, contagion is quite robust to other parameter choices. Two crucial
parameters are investors’ beliefs and wealth. So, let us keep the rest of the
O
P
values at the original levels and fix q 0 = .9 and eO
s = 20. Define q −q as the
P
O
disagreement and e − e as wealth gap between investors. Figure 5 presents
a grid of simulations. In all the regions numbered from 1 to 11 contagion
holds in equilibrium. The different regions correspond to different regimes
in terms of asset holdings and whether collateral constraints are binding or
not. Region 1 corresponds to simulation 5. But contagion holds also in less
extreme portfolio regimes. For example in regime 8 optimists and pessimists
both hold H in both states in the second period, but still optimists hold more
H at D than at U so the portfolio effect is still present. The only regions
in which contagion breaks down are the two lower regions 12 and 13 where
q P = .8999 and q O − q P is near zero. Of course, at the origin we are back
to the case of a representative agent. Table 12 describes all these regimes
showing at each node what are the asset holdings for each type of investor
and whether the borrowing constraint is binding or not. A “–” indicates
closed credit markets (there is no borrowing or lending). In regimes 1 to 11,
if credit markets are active, optimists always borrow and pessimists always
lend and the contrary is true in regimes 12 and 13.
With complete markets, an increase in pessimists’ wealth would destroy
contagion. With incomplete markets contagion holds regardless of the wealth
gap (provided there is disagreement between agents). In fact, the degree of
contagion increases (given a disagreement level) with the wealth gap, both
measured as the gap between U and D or as the fall from 1 to D as shown
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in graphs 1 and 2.17 The reason for this is that richer pessimists lend more
elastically, making for lower interest rates in equilibrium. With lower interest
rates borrowing capacities go up (even with constant collateral capacities)
and hence the optimist’s ability to hold more extreme portfolio positions.

4.3

Flight to Liquidity and Endogenous Margins

In this section we go back to our example in simulation 4 with emerging
market assets of differing quality, but no collateral. Although leverage was
not crucial for contagion, now it will play the shining role.
Simulation 6 solves the equilibrium for the same parameters as in simulation 4, except that now both emerging market assets can be used as collateral. Without loss of generality we still assume that this is not the case for
H. Tables 13 and 14 present the results.
The portfolio and consumption effects are still present, and hence so is
contagion. However, simulation 6 exhibits a new thing: differential contagion. The price of E B falls more than the price of E G from U to D and from
1 to D.
The key is that different assets have different endogenous collateral capacities. These differences become important and lead to different collateral
values when agents’ need for liquidity, measured by the liquidity preference,
increases. At D collateral capacities are very different and liquidity preference is very high, at U collateral capacities are also very different but the
liquidity preference is small, and at 1 collateral capacities are nearly the same.
Thus the collateral values of E G and E B are very different at D whereas at
1 and U they are similar.
More precisely, at D the collateral capacities of E G and E B are quite
different. These give rise to borrowing capacities per dollar of asset of 1 −
mG = .26 and 1−mB = .07 respectively. The high liquidity preference, LP =
.2, gives rise to different collateral values of CV G = .04 and CV B = .02.
At U the collateral capacities are also very different, however the liquidity
17

We just show the degree of contagion for two disagreement levels, more information
is available upon request.
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preference is low (LP = .03) so that the collateral values are negligible and
thus virtually the same, CV G = .006 and CV B = .003. At 1, the endogenous
borrowing capacities per dollar of assets are 1 − mG = .88 and 1 − mB = .86,
which though big are very similar. Combined with a low liquidity preference
(LP = .03) they lead to very similar, though not negligible, collateral values
of CV G = .031 and CV B = .03.
This differentiated behavior in collateral values explains the differential
fall in prices. The fall in payoff values for both assets is virtually the same.
From U to D the fall in payoff values of 16.5% for both assets is cushioned
by an increase in the collateral value of 3.66% for E G but only of 1.86% for
E B . From 1 to D the difference is even more drastic, since the fall in payoffs
of 12% is cushioned by an increase in the collateral value of 0.9% for E G but
exacerbated by a further decrease in the collateral value of 1.23% for E B .18
We say that there is Flight to Liquidity when there is an increase in the
spread between assets through differential movements of collateral values.
This happens when: (1) liquidity preference is high, (2) margins are high
and (3) the dispersion of margins between assets is high. During a flight to
liquidity, investors would rather buy those assets that enable them to borrow
money more easily (lower margins). The other side of the coin, what we
could call Flight from Illiquidity, is that investors who need to raise cash get
more by selling those assets on which they did not borrow money (higher
margins) because the sales revenues net of loan repayments are higher.
Traditionally, the price deterioration of low quality assets is explained in
terms of “flight to quality” type of arguments: an increase in risk aversion
lowers the payoff value of volatile assets. Flight to Liquidity emphasizes a
different channel. The gap in prices is created entirely by movements in collateral values. Even in the absence of flight to quality behavior (associated
with movements in payoff values), we may still observe a bigger price deterioration of bad quality assets due to time-varying liquidity preference and
margin requirements.
Finally, the model also provides a testable forecasting result. As was
mentioned before, information volatility is not stationary in our model. The
18

As before, it can be shown that the result is robust to different parameter specifications. We will save the reader from this discussion since there is nothing conceptually new
from the analysis already presented.
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volatility of expectations of the final payoffs increases from 0 at 1, to .56 at
U and D for E G , and from 0 at 1, to .67 at U and D for E B . From this we
might expect the margins for E G and E B to be 0 at 1, and higher for E G ,
and even higher for E B , at U and D. This is indeed the case at U and D.
However, contagion at D causes volatility in the prices of E G and E B , and
thus positive margins at 1. The flight to liquidity at D causes more price
price volatility for E B than for E G , and hence higher margins at 1 for E B
than for E G . Thus the margins during normal times at 1 can predict which
asset will suffer more during future flight to liquidity at anxious times.
To sum up, different endogenous margin requirements create differential
contagion and flight to liquidity which gives a rationale for Stylized Fact 2.
Real world margins during normal times are 10% for high-rated emerging
markets bonds and 20% or more for low-rated Emerging Markets bonds.
Provided that the expected flow of future information across credit ratings
is symmetric, these margins during normal times indicate that low-rated
emerging market bonds will be the ones suffering during future flight to
liquidity episodes.

5

Model II: Collateral General Equilibrium
with Adverse Selection

In this section we will focus on the issuance problem. For this, we extend the
first model. Instead of taking the supply of E as fixed we explicitly model
the issuance choice of emerging market assets.

5.1
5.1.1

Model
Emerging Countries

In each state, s ∈ S, each country ks chooses to issue assets. To simplify our
calculation we assume that each country has only one chance to issue assets
and is not allowed to trade on secondary markets. We will also assume that
countries consume only at the period of issuance and at the end.19 Each
19

Adding intermediate consumption when countries are not allowed to trade or issue
would not affect any of the results.
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country ks has Bernoulli utility uks (x) for consumption of x units of the
consumption good in state s and in states t ∈ ST (s), where ST (s) is the set of
terminal nodes that follow s. Utilities satisfy the usual assumptions discussed
before. Country ks assigns subjective probability qαks to the transition from
any state α∗ to α. (Naturally qsks = 1). Letting q̄αks be the product of all qαks
along the path from s to α, the von-Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility
to country ks is
U ks =

t(α)−t(s) ks

q̄αks δks

X

u (xα )

(14)

α∈{s}∪ST (s)

Each country ks has an endowment of 1 unit of asset E k to sell to investors
at its issuance date s. We denote the issuance at s by z ks . Countries are
endowed with the consumption good only at each terminal node t ∈ ST (s),
hence they need to issue debt in order to consume at s.
5.1.2

Types and Asymmetric Information

In each state s ∈ S there are two types of countries, “good”, k = G, and
“bad”, k = B, issuing assets in the primary market. Assets issued by different
types differ in their deliveries; the good type always pays at least as much
as the bad type: DαG ≥ DαB , ∀α ∈ S. We assume that the deliveries of
countries of the same type are the same (even if they were issued at different
states). Thus, all assets known to be good (bad) at s will trade for the same
price psG (psB ), whether issued at s and trading for the first on the primary
market at s, or issued previously and trading on the secondary market at
s. However, the prices psG and psB may or may not coincide. The key
element in this extension is that there is asymmetric information: investors
cannot perfectly observe a country’s type and hence the type of credit they
are trading.
5.1.3

The Market as a Designer

At this point we face a problem: how can we make compatible the adverse
selection problem arising from the asymmetric information with the perfect
competition framework described in Model I? To attack this problem we
follow the modeling strategy used in Dubey-Geanakoplos (2002) to study
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insurance in a different competitive framework. We apply their techniques
to extend the Collateral General Equilibrium model of section 3 to encompass
adverse selection and issuance rationing.
In each state s ∈ S, there are many different debt markets, each characterized by a quantity limit (which a seller in that market cannot exceed) and
its associated market clearing price:
−
→
ps = {(zs , ps (zs )); zs ∈ (0, 1], ps ∈ <+ }.

(15)

→
The issuance-price schedule −
ps is taken as given and emerging countries
and investors decide in which of these debt markets to participate. We assume
exclusivity, i.e., countries can only issue (sell) in one debt market at any given
time. So they must choose a quantity zs to sell and then take as given the
corresponding market clearing price ps (zs ).
→
Given the price schedule −
ps , country ks decides consumption and issuance
in order to maximize utility (10) subject to the budget set defined as
1+S (s)
→
B ks (−
ps ) ={(x, z)∈ R+ T × R+ :
xs ≤ ps (z)z
z≤1
∀α ∈ ST (s) : xα = eks
α + (1 − z)Dαk }

Consumption at s has to be less or equal than the income from issuance
of quantity z. Issuance at s cannot exceed the total endowment of the asset
k of 1 unit. Finally, consumption at each terminal node that follows s has
to be less or equal than the endowment of the consumption good plus the
deliveries on the remaining asset that was not sold at s.
Investors who buy assets in market (zs , ps (zs )) get a pro rata share of
the deliveries of all assets sold in that market. If the proportion of the sales
at zs of the bad type exceeds the proportion of bad types in the economy,
then the buyer at zs gets an adverse selection. Investors are assumed to be
rational and to have the correct expectation of deliveries from each market
(zs , ps (zs )). Thus, if only one country type is choosing to sell at the quantity
zs , then it reveals its type, and from then on, its asset payoffs are known to be
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the corresponding type. With this interpretation there is room for signalling
as well as adverse selection without destroying market anonymity. Countries
may (falsely) signal more reliable deliveries by publicly committing to (small)
quantity markets where the prices are high because the market expects only
good types to sell there. The quantity limit characterizing each debt market is
exogenous and the associated price is set endogenously as in any traditional
competitive model. However, it may occur that in equilibrium only a few
debt markets are active, even when all the markets are priced in equilibrium.
In this sense, the active quantities are set endogenously as well, without the
need of any contract designer. Market clearing and optimizing behavior are
enough.
5.1.4

Separating Collateral Equilibrium

A formal definition of equilibrium in this model is quite involved, because
there are so many markets, and because the secondary market prices will
depend on what is revealed in the primary markets. However, there is a
shortcut to this problem. We say that an equilibrium is pooling if at any state
s two countries of different types decide to sell the same amount, and hence
participate in the same market. In contrast, an equilibrium is separating
when different types, Gs and Bs, always issue different amounts in the same
state. Dubey-Geanakoplos (2002) show that their model exhibits a unique
refined separating equilibrium, and no equilibrium involving any pooling.
Their techniques are still valid in the present model to show the existence
of such an equilibrium. A formal definition of a separating equilibrium is
simpler.
A Separating Collateral Equilibrium is defined as a standard Collateral
→
Equilibrium ((−
p , r), (xi , y i , φi )i∈I , (xGs , zGs , xBs , zBs )s∈S ) with the following
extra requirement: zGs < zBs .20
Finally, let us stress why it is so important that the model exhibits a
separating equilibrium from a computational point of view. In general, equilibrium would have forced us to solve for prices for all possible quantity limits,
20

The definition of equilibrium requires prices ps (zs ) for those markets zs that are not
active to be determined as well. For zs < zGs , ps (zs ) is determined so that the good type
is indifferent between issuing zs and zGs . For zs ≥ zGs , ps (zs ) is such that the bad type
is indifferent between zs and zBs .
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and to distinguish assets sold later by how much of them were originally issued. This is an infinite dimensional problem. In a separating equilibrium we
need only to keep track of good and bad asset prices, pGs and pBs , and good
and bad issuance levels, zGs and zBs . Now we have reduced the problem to
calculate a finite set of variables as we had before.

5.2

Adverse Selection, Margins and Issuance Rationing

Simulation 7 solves the equilibrium for the same parameters as before. The
new parameters are the ones describing countries. Utilities are quadratic :
P
t(s)
U ks = (xs − βx2s ) + s0 ∈T (s) q̄αks δks (xs0 − βx2s0 ) with β = 1/370. Endowments
ks
and beliefs are the same as the optimists investors, so eks
=
s0 ∈T (s) = 20, q
.9. Tables 15 and 16 present the results. The price behavior described in
simulation 6 is still present here: there is contagion and flight to liquidity.
Portfolio and consumption effects are present, hence both emerging market
asset prices fall from U to D and from 1 to D. However, since E B exhibits
higher margins in equilibrium, its price falls more.
The new thing in this simulation comes from the supply side. At D there
is a drop in issuance, and more importantly a more severe drop for the good
B
type. The bad type issuance goes from z1B = 1 to zD
= .75 whereas the good
G
G
type issuance goes from z1 = .8 all the way to zD = .08. The gap in issuance
between U and D is also bigger for the good type than for the bad type.
Now, adverse selection plays the leading role.21
It is not surprising that with contagion and the corresponding fall in
prices, equilibrium issuance falls as well. The interesting thing is that flight
to liquidity combined with informational asymmetries generates issuance rationing; the fall in price of the good type is less yet its drop in issuance is
much more. The greater the price difference between types the more drastic
the drop in good quality issuance.
The explanation is that the bigger price spread between types requires a
smaller good type issuance for a separating equilibrium to exist. Unless the
good issuance levels become onerously low, bad types would be more tempted
by the bigger price spread to mimic good types and sell at the high price pGs .
21

As in section 3, the simulation is robust to other choices of parameters.
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The good type are able to separate themselves by choosing low enough There
zGs since it is more costly for the bad type to rely on the payoff of its own
asset for final consumption than it is for the good type.
In standard models of adverse selection incentive compatibility constraints
play a central role. In the present model with adverse selection embedded in
a general equilibrium framework, the presence of a price-issuance schedule
and utility maximization subject to budget constraints are enough.
In a world with no informational noise, spillovers from other markets may
even help good issuance relative to bad issuance. However, if to market incompleteness, investor disagreement and heterogeneous margin requirements,
we add some degree of informational noise between countries and investors,
we get that good quality issuance suffers more.22 This result solves our third
problem and in particular rationalizes Stylized Fact 3: high rated issuance
falls more than low-rated issuance during closures despite the fact that highrated spreads increase less than low-rated spreads.
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Figure 5: Robustness Analysis
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Table 1: Primary Market Closures
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H
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pU

0.9183

0.9083
7.99

-0.011
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%
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Simulations 1 and 2.
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Asset

Simulation 1:

Table 2:

Table 3:
Asset

Simulation 3, Incomplete Markets.
Prices.
1
U
D
(U-D)/U (1-D)/1
%
%

E

0.7954

0.863

0.7273

15.72

8.56

H
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Table 4:

Asset

Simulation 3, Incomplete Markets.
Portfolio.
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Table 5:
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Table 6: Simulation 4, Incomplete Markets
with 3 assets. Prices.
Asset
1
U
D
(U-D)/U (1-D)/1
%
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Table 7:

Asset

Simulation 4, Incomplete Markets
with 3 assets. Portfolio.
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P
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D
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Table 8:

Simulation 4, Incomplete Markets with 3 assets.
Consumption.
U
D
UU
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Table 9:

Simulation 5, Incomplete Markets with Collateral. Prices.
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U
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%
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%

E

0.8511

0.8695

0.7416

14.7

12.86

H

0.9316

0.9985

0.7306

26.83

21.58

loan (rs)

0

0

0

Table 10:
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Simulation 5, Incomplete Markets with Collateral
Price components, Liquidity Preference and Margins.
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Table 11:

Simulation 5, Incomplete Markets with Collateral, Allocations.
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Table 13: Simulation 6, Incomplete Markets with Collateral. 3 assets.
Prices.
Asset
1
U
D
(U-D)/U
(1-D)/1
%
%
G

0.8724

0.889

0.7747

12.86

11.2

B
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loan B (rs)

0

0

0

Table 14:

LP

Simulation 6, Incomplete Markets with Collateral. 3 assets.
Price components, Liquidity Preference and Margins.
1
U
D
(U-D)/pU
(1-D)/p1
%
%
0.0396
0.0364
0.199

Assets
Price comp
PV

0.8411

0.8824

0.7355

16.52

12.1

CV

0.0313

0.0066

0.0392

-3.66

-0.9

m

0.1119

0.7747

0.741

PV

0.8264

0.872

0.7269

16.58

11.62

CV

0.0302

0.0033

0.0196

-1.86

1.23

m

0.1371

0.9423

0.9315

G

Price comp

B

Table 15: Simulation 7, Incomplete Markets with Collateral
and Adverse Selection. Prices.
Asset
1
U
D
(U-D)/U
%

(1-D)/1
%

G

0.8149

0.8409

0.6957

17.3

14.6

B

0.7807

0.8117

0.6385

21.3

18.2

H

0.8849

0.9967

0.6326

36.5

28.5

loan G (rs)

0

0

0

loan B (rs)

0

0

0

Table 16: Simulation 7, Incomplete Markets with Collateral
and Adverse Selection. Issuance.
Type
1
U
D
(U-D)/U
(1-D)/1
%
%
G

0.8018

0.8524

0.0808

90

89.9

B

1

1

0.75

25

25
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Graph 2: Contagion for disagreement level .4
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